DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

BOARD FOR CORRECTION OF MILITARY RECORDS 

 

 
Application for Correction of  
Coast Guard Record of: 
 
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
 

 
 
BCMR Docket  
No.  2002-055 

 

FINAL DECISION 

This  final  decision,  dated  November  14,  2002,  is  signed  by  the  three  duly 

The  applicant  enlisted  in  the  Coast  Guard  on  November  2,  1970.    He  was 

 
 
This is a proceeding under the provisions of section 1552 of Title 10, and section 
425 of Title 14 of the United States Code.  It was docketed on February 22, 2001 upon 
the  Board’s  receipt  of  the  applicant’s  complete  application  for  the  correction  of  his 
military record. 
 
 
appointed members who were designated to serve as the Board in this case. 
 
Applicant’s Request for Relief 
 
 
discharged honorably on September 7, 1972, as a conscientious objector.   
 
 
Twenty-nine years after his discharge, he asked the BCMR to change the reason 
for  his  discharge  from  conscientious  objector  to  physical  disability  due  to  psychosis.  
The applicant alleged that he suffered from psychosis while in the Coast Guard, and it 
was  during  a  psychotic  state  in  1972  that  he  requested  a  conscientious  objector 
discharge.  Also he alleged that the mental status examination he underwent as part of 
the  processing  for  a  conscientious  discharge  was  improperly  done,  that  his  medical 
records  were  falsified,  and  that  he  was  misdiagnosed.  He  further  alleged  that 
information was withheld from him during the processing of his conscientious objector 
application.  The applicant is seeking to improve his chances of obtaining full disability 
benefits from the Department of Veterans Affairs [DVA] with a correction to his Coast 
Guard record.  In this regard the applicant stated the following: 
 

While  [I]  was  barred  from  [DVA]  benefits  from  1972  discharge  for 
Conscientious Objector until 1993, when the [DVA] lifted that bar, [I] now 
seek to apply for benefits.  [I] was well aware of the bar when in 1992 [I] 
applied  for  benefits  .  .  .  and  was  told  that  [I]  could  only  receive  limited 
medical  benefits  based  upon  financial  status.    In  late  1999,  the  [DVA] 
psychiatrist referred [me] to apply for full medical and pension benefits.  
[I am] not seeking any monetary amount from the Coast Guard, only the 

Final Decision: BCMR Docket No. 2002-055 

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opportunity (based upon accurate service record) to proceed with [a DVA] 
claim for benefits.   

 

 
 
The applicant was directed on the application form (DD Form 149) to state when 
he discovered the alleged error or injustice.  He listed 1999 as the date of discovery.  The 
application form further requires that if the date of discovery was more than three years 
prior to the date of application, the applicant must explain why the Board should find 
that it is in the interest of justice to consider the application.  The applicant stated that 
he did not discover that he might be eligible for DVA benefits until November 1999.  He 
stated that he was advised at that time by a psychiatrist to seek benefits from the DVA.  
The applicant further stated, citing Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 66 S. Cr. 582 
(1946), that mere delay alone, no matter how long, is insufficient to constitute laches.   
 

SUMMARY OF RECORD AND SUBMISSIONS 

 
On January 12, 1972, the applicant asserted in a letter to his commanding officer 
 
that he was a conscientious objector.  On March 8, 1972, he requested discharge from 
the Coast Guard as a conscientious objector.   Before such a discharge can be granted, 
Coast  Guard  regulations  require  that  a  chaplain  interview  the  member  and  offer  an 
opinion as to the member's sincerity and depth of conviction.  Also, the member is to be 
interviewed  by  a  psychiatrist  “who  shall  submit  a  written  report    .  .  .  indicating  the 
presence  or  absence  of  any  psychiatric  disorder  which  would  warrant  treatment  or 
disposition  through  medical  channels,  or  such  character  or  personality  disorder  as  to 
warrant  recommendation  for  appropriate  administrative  action.”    See  COMDTINST 
1900.8.  An  investigating  officer  (IO)  is  appointed  to  investigate  the  member’s 
conscientious objector claim.  The IO conducts a hearing on the application and issues a 
report  with  conclusions  and  a  recommended  disposition  based  on  all  the  evidence  of 
record including the chaplain and psychiatric reports.  
 
 
A  chaplain  and  a  psychiatrist  saw  the  applicant  on  February  17,  1972  in 
furtherance  of  his  conscientious  objector  application.    The  chaplain  supported  the 
applicant's  application  for  discharge  as  a  conscientious  objector,  finding  that  the 
applicant "was sincere in his feeling that he could no longer participate in the activities 
of the Coast Guard."  The psychiatrist wrote the following about the applicant’s mental 
status: 
 

[The applicant] is a slender man of medium height who talks in a coherent 
logical  manner  with  his  attitudes  overflowing  with  humanistic  idealism      
.  .  .  There  is  a  paucity  of  pragmatic  consideration  in  regard  to  personal 
security and gratifying relationships with people.  He states he can only 
achieve  a  sense  of  accomplishment  when  he  works  as  a  volunteer.    He 
evidently  avoids  emotional  closeness  and  strong  feelings  of  [an] 
aggressive  or  sexual  nature.    There  is  no  indication  of  a  thought  or 

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affectual  disturbance  of  psychotic  proportion.    This  man  has  a  mild 
personality disorder which permits him to withdraw in emotionally laden 
situations that he lacks confidence to handle.  He is also in the midst of an 
adolescent  identity  crisis. 
  His  meek  rebellion  against  his  mother 
manifested  in  his  resistance  to  follow  her  advice  about  college  and  a 
practical philosophy of life has now been displaced to the Coast Guard as 
shown  by  his  resistance  in  accepting  military  attitudes.    His  decision  to 
obtain  [conscientious  objector]  status  is  not  related  to  any  mental  illness 
per  se,  but  is  closely  tied  into  a  mild  personality  disorder  and  an 
adolescent  adjustment  reaction  (an  identity  crisis).    There  is  no  essential 
need  for  psychotherapy.    Though  he  would  object  and  possibly  become 
more  overtly  rebellious,  he  might  benefit  by  continuing  in  the  Coast 
Guard  with  a  conscientious  objector  status  involving  no  participation  in 
“war” related activities.   

 

 
On April 10, 1972, after a hearing and reviewing all the evidence of record, 
 
the  IO  recommended  that  the  applicant's  application  for  discharge  as  a  conscientious 
objector be approved.  (A civilian lawyer represented the applicant at the hearing.) On 
June 27, 1972, the Commandant ordered the applicant discharged under Article 12-B-6 
(convenience  of  the  government)  of  the  Personnel  Manual.  He  was  discharged  on 
September 7, 1972, after a physical examination that determined he was medically fit for 
discharge. 
 
 
 
The  record  indicated  that  approximately  12  years  after  his  discharge  from  the 
Coast  Guard,  the  applicant  had  an  emergency  psychological  evaluation  on  January  4 
and January 9, 1985.  At that time the psychiatrist wrote that the applicant "appeared to 
be in a borderline psychotic state with paranoia in evidence."  The applicant related the 
onset  of  his  difficulties  to  a  then-current  work  situation  wherein  he  suffered  a  work-
related back injury.  The injury apparently caused him to lose some time from work and 
to be assigned to lighter duties when he could work. The applicant told the psychologist 
that upon his return to work his relationship with the employer became strained.  He 
was subsequently fired.  The psychologist noted the applicant's psychiatric evaluation 
during  the  processing  of  his  conscientious  objector  application  and  offered  the 
following impression and assessment of the applicant's current condition.   
 

[The applicant] appears to be suffering from a major psychiatric disorder 
which  appears  clearly  related  to  a  job  related  injury  and  subsequently 
being  fired.    Because  of  the  psychiatric  disorder,  the  patient  is  clearly 
psychiatrically  disabled  to  the  point  of  hospitalization  being  considered 
and is being treated for his psychiatric disability with Haldol . . .   [He] is 
suffering from severe adjustment disorder with atypical features . . .  The 
adjustment  disorder  is  of  a  borderline  psychotic  nature.  In addition the 
applicant  may  have  an  underlying  personality  disorder  which  is 

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extremely difficult to evaluate at this time and will be left undiagnosed at 
this  point.    Additionally,  he has shown evidence of alcohol, cocaine and 
cannabis abuse over the past several months; although this has diminished 
recently.    It  is  my  impression  that  the  patient's  severe  psychiatric 
difficulties  are  accelerating  and  this  acceleration  is  related  to  the 
sluggishness  under  which  the  legal  system  works  in  dealing  with 
disability cases. . . .  It is difficult to apportion past personality factors as 
well as current work situation in assessing his disability, but it is clear to 
me that being fired played a major role in his current situation.  It is clear 
that there is not history of significant psychiatric treatment in the past and 
his need for increasing psychiatric and psychological care is a testament to 
the  relationship  between  the  injury  and  the  subsequent  firing  in  his 
current disability.       

 
 
On May 1, 1985, the applicant filed a claim for disability compensation with the 
DVA for a back condition and a mental disorder.  He had a psychiatric evaluation on 
July 31, 1985, but he submitted an incomplete report of this to the Board.   
 
 
On  September  24,  1985,  the  DVA  granted  the  applicant  a  50%  non-service 
connected disability rating, which included 30% for an adjustment disorder with mixed 
emotional features.  The non-service connected disability rating permitted the applicant 
to receive limited medical treatment from the DVA, but does not include compensation. 
 
 
Around  February  2000,  the  applicant  reopened  his  DVA  claim  by  asserting  a 
disability  due  to  post  traumatic  stress  disorder  resulting  from  a  psychotic  reaction  to 
war  drills  while  on  a  Coast  Guard  cutter  in  1971  or  1972  and  from  witnessing  the 
misfiring of a gun that hit a fellow sailor in the face.  1  It appears from the evidence of 
record  that  the  DVA  never  ruled  on  the  applicant's  PTSD  claim  due  to  a  lack  of 
information  from  the  applicant.    The  applicant  stated  that  he  is  no  longer  claiming  a 
disability due to PTSD.    
 
 
On March 17, 2000, a psychiatrist evaluated the applicant to determine whether 
the applicant was mentally responsible for the commission of a felony and/or whether 
he was competent to stand trial for the alleged offense.  That psychiatrist diagnosed the 
applicant  as  suffering  from  Bipolar II Disorder (Recurrent Major Depressive Episodes 
with Hypomanic Episodes, and Alcohol Abuse) and opined that the applicant "had an 
impaired  and  substantially  lacking  capacity  to  appreciate  the  wrongfulness  of  his 
conduct" at the time of the offense. 
 

                                            
1   There is nothing in the applicant's military record showing that he participated in war drills or that he 
witnessed a fellow sailor's injury from a misfired gun during one of these drills. 

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A psychiatric evaluation report dated April 27, 2000, states that the applicant was 
diagnosed  as  suffering  from  a  schizo-affective  disorder,  alcohol  abuse  which  is  in 
remission, a history of fighting, a back condition, a serious mental illness, and a history 
of substance abuse, housing, employment and financial problems.  
 
 
wrote the following: 
 

The  applicant  submitted  a  letter  from  his  mother  dated  January  11,  2001.    She 

When the applicant came home in 1972 AWOL (absent without authority), 
I was very upset.  I took him to see . . . the psychiatrist who had treated his 
father previously.  I asked the doctor if it were possible [for the applicant] 
to develop the same mental illness as his father.  [The psychiatrist] said it 
was not only possible, but probable. . . .  This conference was the first time 
that there was any hint of mental illness for [the applicant].   

 
The  applicant  submitted  a  psychological evaluation prepared for the probation 
 
division  of  a  circuit  court,  dated  February  19,  2002.    This  psychologist wrote that she 
was treating the applicant for an anxiety disorder.  The report stated that some of the 
trauma features related to the applicant's PTSD were in large part due to "unfortunate 
events from the military."  The report stated that anger is a major symptom of PTSD, for 
which the applicant was being treated.   
 
The applicant submitted an undated statement from the psychiatrist who treated 
 
him  in  the  1990s.    This  psychiatrist  wrote,  "[the  applicant]  is  a  patient  I  have  treated 
since 1993.  [He] appears totally and permanently disabled at this time.  I recommend 
he file for a NSC (non-service connected) pension and request  [an examination] by a 
non-treating VA psychiatrist." 
 
Views of the Coast Guard 
 
 
On August 5, 2002, the Chief Counsel of the Coast Guard recommended that the 
applicant’s  request  be  denied.    He  asserted  that  "1)  the  applicant  failed  to  submit  a 
timely application and has not provided any basis or reason why it is in the interest of 
justice to excuse the delay, and; 2) even if the Board should find it appropriate to waive 
the statute of limitations, there is no merit to this case." 
 
 
Pursuant to 33 C.F.R. 52.22, this application should have been filed within three 
years of the date the alleged error or injustice was, or should have been, discovered. He 
stated that the applicant did not provide a reason for not filing his application within 
three  years  from  the  date  of  his  discharge,  approximately  29  years  ago.    The  Chief 
Counsel  argued  that  such  an  explanation  is  necessary  in  order  for  the  Board  to 
determine whether it is in the interest of justice to waive the statute of limitations in this 
case.   The Chief Counsel stated that in accordance with Dickson v. Secretary of Defense, 

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68 F. 3rd 1396 (D.C. Cir. 1995) he performed a cursory review of the merits in this case 
to determine whether it was in the interest of justice to waive the statute of limitations.   
 
 
The  Chief  Counsel  stated  that  based on his cursory review, the Commandant's 
decision to discharge applicant from the service was thoroughly justified based on the 
record.    He  stated  that  there  is  no  evidence  in  the  record  that  the  applicant  suffered 
from,  nor  complained  of,  any  sort  of  physical  or  mental  disability  during  his  entire 
enlistment.    Nor,  according  to  the  Chief  Counsel,  is  there  any  evidence  that  the 
applicant  was  denied  any  due  process  in  connection  with  his  discharge  as  a 
conscientious objector.   
 
 
The Chief Counsel stated that the evidence in the record strongly indicates that 
the  applicant's  psychiatric  problems  began  in  the  1980s,  nearly  ten  years  after  his 
discharge  from  the  Coast  Guard.    He  further  stated  that  other  than  the  applicant's 
blanket  assertion,  there  is  no  evidence  to  suggest  that  the  "war  drills"  performed  on 
board a Coast Guard cutter in 1972 were the basis for the applicant's alleged PTSD or 
other psychiatric disorders.   
 

PHYSICAL DISABILITY EVALUATION SYSTEM 

 

Chapter  2-A-36  of  COMDTINST  M1850.2B  (Physical  Disability  Evaluation  System 
Manual) defines a physical disability in the following manner:   
 

Any  manifest  or  latent  physical  impairment  or  impairments  due  to 
disease,  injury  or  aggravation  by  service  of  an  existing  condition, 
regardless of the degree, that separately makes or in combination make a 
service  member  unfit  for continued duty.  The term "physical disability" 
includes  mental  disease  but  not  such  inherent  defects  as  behavior 
disorders, personality disorders, and primary mental deficiency. 

 

Chapter  2-A-44  of  this  provision  defines  unfit  for  continued  duty  in  the  following 
manner: 
 

The  status  of  an  individual  member  who  is  physically  and/or  mentally 
unable  to  perform  the  duties  of  office,  grade,  rank,  or  rating  because  of 
physical  disability  incurred  while  entitled  to  basic  pay.    The  status  of 
unfitness applies to individuals unable to perform specialized duty such 
as  duty  involving  flying  or  diving  only  if  the  performance  of  the 
specialized duty is a requirement of the member’s enlisted rating. 

 

 

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 

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The  Board  makes  the  following  findings  and  conclusions  on  the  basis  of  the 

1.  The Board has jurisdiction concerning this matter pursuant to section 1552 of 

 
applicant’s submissions, the Coast Guard’s submissions, and applicable law: 
 
 
title 10, United States Code.  The application was not timely.  
 
 
2.    To  be  timely,  an  application  for  correction  of  a  military  record  must  be 
submitted within three years of when the alleged error or injustice was or should have 
been discovered.  See 33 CFR 52.22. The applicant was discharged from the Coast Guard 
approximately twenty-nine years ago.  He should have discovered the alleged error at 
that time, although he claimed that he did not discover it until November 1999.    The 
Board may still consider the application on the merits, however, if it finds it is in the 
interest  of  justice  to  do  so.    The  interest  of  justice  is  determined  by  taking  into 
consideration the reasons for and the length of the delay and the likelihood of success 
on the merits of the claim. See Dickson v. Secretary of Defense, 68 F. 3rd 1396 (D.D.C. 
1995).   
 
 
3.  The applicant stated that he did not file his application sooner because he was 
not aware that he might be eligible for DVA benefits until November 1999.  The Board is 
not persuaded by this argument and notes that in 1985, the DVA denied the applicant's 
claim  for  a  service  connected  disability,  while  finding  him  50%  disabled  due  to  non-
service connected disabilities.  This finding entitled him to limited medical care but not 
compensation.      This  finding  of  a  non-service  connected  disability  and  the  denial  of 
disability compensation by the DVA in 1985 should have put the applicant on notice at 
that time that he needed to challenge the reason for his discharge if he thought it to be 
erroneous.   
 
 
4.  Additionally, after a review of the merits, the Board finds the applicant is not 
likely to succeed on the merits of his claim that he should have been discharged from 
the Coast Guard due to a psychotic mental disability.  The psychiatrist who evaluated 
the  applicant  during  the  conscientious  objector  proceedings  stated  that  there  was  no 
"indication  of  a  thought  or  affectual  disturbance  of  psychotic  proportion."    The 
psychiatrist did state that the applicant suffered from a mild personality disorder and 
that he was in the midst of an adolescent identity crisis.  Personality disorders are not 
considered to be physical disabilities under the PDES.   
 
 
5.    In  addition,  on  September  5,  1972  the  applicant  underwent  a  separation 
physical  and  was  fit  for  separation.    There  is  no  medical  evidence  in  the  applicant's 
military record or in the evidence he submitted showing that he suffered from or was 
treated  for  a  psychiatric  condition  until  1984  or  85,  approximately  12  years  after  his 
discharge from the Coast Guard.  
 

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6.    Although  the  psychiatric  and  psychological  reports  submitted  by  the 
applicant,  beginning  in  1985,  indicate  that  he  currently  suffers  from  a  mental  illness, 
none of these evaluations, except for one, claimed that the applicant's mental illness was 
in  any  way  related  to  his  time  spent  on  active  duty.    For  instance,  the  1985  medical 
report stated that the applicant's psychiatric disorder appeared to be related to a civilian 
job injury and subsequent firing.  In this regard that psychologist wrote "[i]t is clear that 
there is no history of significant psychiatric and psychological treatment in the past and 
[the applicant's] need for increasing psychiatric and psychological care is a testament to 
the  relationship  between  the  [current  work]  injury  and  the  subsequent  firing  in  his 
current  disability."    The  2002  psychological  evaluation  report  was  the  only  one 
connecting  the  applicant's  military  experience  to  alleged  PTSD.  Such  evidence  is  not 
persuasive in light of the other evidence to the contrary and in light of the fact it was 
prepared  approximately  30  years  after  his  discharge  and  was  based  on  his  assertions 
which are not supported by the record.  
 
7.  Moreover, in 1985 the DVA found that the applicant suffered from a mental 
 
illness, but determined that it was not service connected.  The applicant has presented 
no evidence, except for his own allegations of error, to support his contention that he 
suffered from "psychosis" or even PTSD while on active duty from November 1970 to 
September 7, 1972.   
 
 
8.  The Board finds that it is not in the interest of justice to waive the statute of 
limitations in this case due to the passage of time (approximately 29 years), the lack of 
any  compelling  reason  for  not  filing  his  application  for  correction  sooner,  and  the 
probable lack of success on the merits in this case. 
 
 
9.    All  of  the  applicant's  allegations,  whether  or  not  addressed  within  the 
Findings and Conclusions, have been considered by the Board and found to be without 
merit. 
 
 

10.  Accordingly, the applicant’s request should be denied. 

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ORDER 

The application of former XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX, USCG, for correction 

 
 
 
of his military record is denied. 
 
 
 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 
 

 

 

 
 

 
 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 
 

 
 

 
 
 
 

 
 
 
 

 
 
 

 

 
 Edmund T. Sommer, Jr. 

 

 

 

 
 Dorothy J. Ulmer 

 

 

 
 
 Betsy L. Wolf